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The Brigham Young University Football
Program and the Analytics Revolution
Nelson Chung

T

he Brigham Young University football program is the most visible
component of the LDS Church’s flagship school. In 2010, it contracted to ESPN the broadcast of a majority of its games for a reported
$800,000 to $1.2 million per home game through 2018.1 During the 2015
season, its eight games on the ESPN–ABC family of networks reached
14.8 million televisions, an average of 1.9 million each game.2 In terms
of missionary value, the program rivals the Mormon Tabernacle Choir.
Along with publicity, the Choir has also invited a fair amount of scholarly attention, most notably a study of how its contract with Columbia
Records led to a secularization of part of its repertoire,3 a chapter in the
University of Illinois Press’s Mormonism and Music volume,4 an entire
volume of its history in the same publisher’s Music in America series that

1. Ed Szczepanski, “Marriage between BYU and ESPN Still Going Strong,”
Fox Sports, May 19, 2015, http://www.foxsports.com/college-football/story/
marriage-between-byu-and-espn-still-going-strong-051915.
2. “College Football TV Ratings,” Sports Media Watch, http://www.sports
mediawatch.com/college-football-tv-ratings/.
3. Mark Porcaro, “We Have Something Really Going on Between Us Now:
Columbia Records’ Influence on the Repertoire of the Mormon Tabernacle
Choir, 1949–92,” Choral Scholar 1, no. 1 (2009): 41–115.
4. Michael D. Hicks, Mormonism and Music: A History (Urbana-Champaign:
University of Illinois Press, 2003).
BYU Studies Quarterly 55, no. 4 (2016)47
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Nelson Chung
I have always been inspired by world
leaders who believed scientific leadership
to be critical to national competitiveness.
And I became interested in BYU football
when I was ten years old upon listening
to Ty Detmer lead the Cougars to upset
first-ranked Miami in 1990. That event
was also the genesis of my aspirations to
attend BYU, which I did during the era
of Brandon Doman and Luke Staley, also
when Erin Thorn elevated the women’s basketball team to national
prominence.
Through reading a spate of sports analytics works, I accumulated
ideas for BYU football that became the impetus for this a rticle. However, as the writing process unfolded, the article evolved into more
a work of intellectual history, a contextualization of the BYU football program within the growth of analytics, and less an instruction
manual. My main hope for this piece is that it will inspire other quantitatively adept yet passionate BYU fans to contribute their own work
that will benefit the program. Let a thousand regressions bloom.

linked the Choir to Mormon theology on angelic music,5 a review of
that volume,6 and accounts of its European and Pacific tours.7
In contrast, scholarship on BYU sports is scant. A search for peerreviewed sources on lib.byu.edu yielded just three results. Current
5. Michael D. Hicks, The Mormon Tabernacle Choir: A Biography (UrbanaChampaign: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 35–61.
6. Jake Johnson, “The Mormon Tabernacle Choir: A Biography, by Michael
Hicks,” Notes 72, no. 3 (2016): 522–24.
7. Cynthia Doxey, “The Mormon Tabernacle Choir’s European Tours,” in
Regional Studies in Latter-day Saint Church History: Europe, ed. Donald Q.
Cannon and Brent L. Top (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 2003),
185–99; Cynthia Doxey and Lloyd D. Newell, “The Mormon Tabernacle Choir’s
Pacific Tour, 1988,” in Regional Studies in Latter-day Saint Church History: The
Pacific Isles, ed. Reid L. Neilson and others (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies
Center, 2008), 127–92.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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BYU president Kevin J. Worthen, when serving as advancement vice
president, held BYU’s successful lobbying of the National Collegiate
Athletics Association (NCAA) to revoke waivers to their rules accommodating Sunday nonplay to be a case of how internal pressure can
affect nongovernmental bodies.8 The two other works treated past and
residual racial issues surrounding the football program.9 This article
provides a new angle by examining BYU football in light of the proliferation of “analytics,” or advanced statistics, in sports and finds that analytics illuminate the program’s condition across time, predict its future,
and have made their way into the program’s decision-making process.10
The core of this article comprises two parts. In the first part, I demonstrate what the sports analytics revolution’s new ideas about evaluating
teams, positions, and recruiting say about the program’s past, present,
and future. I find that after adjusting for schedule difficulty, the coaching performance of the legendary LaVell Edwards (1972–2000) resulted
in 3.8 more points in margin of victory than that of Bronco Mendenhall
(2005–2015), and 10.8 more points than that of Gary Crowton (2001–
2004). I also find that the best of the LDS talent pool is concentrated at
the most important positions; that BYU is currently operating near its
optimum in acquiring players at the most important position (quarterback), but suboptimally at the second and third most important positions (left tackle and right defensive end/outside linebacker); that the
recent hiring of a coach with well-known recruiting ability is expected to
empower BYU to shift closer to the optimum; and, finally, that entering a
“Power” football conference would affect the program’s recruiting ability.
The second part details the program’s response to the analytics revolution. I gauge the extent to which BYU football has adopted ana
lytics and conclude that the outgoing staff has done so to a substantial
though nonexhaustive degree, while the incoming staff ’s receptiveness
8. Kevin J. Worthen, “The NCAA and Religion: Insights about Non-State
Governance from Sunday Play and End Zone Celebrations,” Utah Law Review
2010, no. 1 (2010): 123–40.
9. Lane Demas, Integrating the Gridiron: Black Civil Rights and American
College Football (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 102–33;
Darron T. Smith, When Race, Religion, and Sport Collide: Black Athletes at BYU
and Beyond (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).
10. This article will not argue for the merits of analytics. The premise of this
paper is that analytics can confer competitive advantages; but it in most cases,
it should supplement, not replace, experiential football knowledge, and success
without analytics is possible.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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to analytics varies among its top-level coaches, from warm to unknown.
Results of this study hold implications for how Church-affiliated institutions respond to changes in the intellectual climate.
Overview of the Sports Analytics Revolution
Before discussing my investigation, I provide a brief overview of the
analytics revolution. As shown in Michael Lewis’s popular book Moneyball, intellectual underpinnings for the growth of sports analytics originated with Bill James, a University of Kansas graduate in economics
and literature and a factory night-watchman.11 James keenly observed
how traditionally regarded baseball statistics like fielding percentage
inadequately captured player abilities. He self-published this and other
findings in 1977 as Baseball Abstracts, with a readership of seventyfive.12 The advent of computer databases expedited data collection and
enabled James to draw contributions from other technically competent
people in creating a body of data and analysis. He systematized those
ideas, which overturned much conventional wisdom, by founding the
field of Sabermetrics, named after the Society for American Baseball
Research (SABR).
As Baumer and Zimbalist documented,13 free agency and collective-
bargaining agreements in Major League Baseball drove up player
salaries and enabled wealthy teams to acquire players unaffordable
to small-market teams. This forced the latter to scramble for ways to
compete with limited budgets. Consequently, the ideas of James and
his followers, especially in player evaluation, were then funneled into
baseball via Oakland A’s general manager (GM) Billy Beane as part of
Beane’s quest to find undervalued players. The first to apply those ideas
extensively, Beane created division-winning teams with payrolls among
the lowest in baseball. Similarly poor teams like the Tampa Bay Rays
and Pittsburgh Pirates followed, enabling themselves to boost competitiveness vis-à-vis wealthier clubs. But, as the Economist notes, nothing
would stop the wealthy from also acquiring analytics-oriented GMs:
“After years of sticking with traditionalists in their front offices, bigmarket clubs are increasingly acquiring brand-name GMs to assemble
11. Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2013).
12. Lewis, Moneyball, 65–66.
13. Benjamin Baumer and Andrew Zimbalist, The Sabermetric Revolution:
Assessing the Growth of Analytics in Baseball (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 21–22.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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their star-studded rosters.”14 Seeing the advantage analytics conveyed,
basketball and football teams joined in.15
The revolution met resistance from traditionalists. Highly successful
Atlanta Braves GM John Schuerholz disparaged statisticians as people
“with green visors and rubber bands around their sleeves and pocket
guards with pens and calculators in their shirt pockets.”16 More recently,
basketball Hall-of-Famer Charles Barkley quipped, “All these guys who
run these organizations who talk about analytics, they have one thing in
common. They’re a bunch of guys who ain't never played the game, and
they never got the girls in high school, and they just want to get in the
game.”17 Schuerholz’s and Barkley’s remarks reflected the sports establishment’s angst over statistical analysis possibly supplanting traditional scouting methods. Fortunately, this tension was diffused somewhat; the latest
book from the leading sabermetrics website BaseballProspectus.com contained two chapters on scouting, suggesting that analytics could improve
scouting, not supplant it.18
The Revolution Shines Light on BYU Football
I begin the investigation by exploring three of the analytics revolution’s
prominent ideas and their relevance to the BYU football program. The
first is the idea of evaluating teams using “computer polls.” The NCAA
used them to qualify teams for postseason games. Popular discontent
led the association to phase out their influence, but the strength of their
logic endures. The second idea involves the importance of the player
tasked with protecting the passer’s blind side, made popular in book and
film. The third idea, unique to college sports, is predicting where high
school players will choose to attend college.
14. D. R., “The Cult of the Genius GM,” Economist, October 15, 2014, http://
www.economist.com/blogs/gametheory/2014/10/brains-v-brawn-baseball.
15. Baumer and Zimbalist, Sabermetric Revolution, 87–101.
16. John Schuerholz, Built to Win: Inside Stories and Leadership Strategies
from Baseball’s Winningest General Manager (New York: Warner, 2006), 29.
17. Matt Moore, “VIDEO: Charles Barkley Declares War on Math with Rant
against ‘Analytics,’ ” CBS Sports, February 11, 2015, http://www.cbssports.com/
nba/eye-on-basketball/25065619/video-charles-barkley-declares-war-on-math
-with-rant-against-analytics.
18. Jason Parks, “How Are Players Scouted, Acquired, and Developed?” in
Extra Innings: More Baseball between the Numbers, ed. Steve Goldman (New
York: Basic, 2012), 133–54; Jason Parks, “From the Buscone to the Big Leagues:
How Is Latin-American Talent Acquired and Developed?” in Goldman, Extra
Innings: More Baseball between the Numbers, 175–97.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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Computer Polls
The analytics revolution produced new ideas for evaluating teams that
illuminate BYU football’s historical performance. Among the earliest
exposures fans had to advanced statistics was through computer polls
like Sagarin, Pomeroy, and Massey, which were used to choose contestants in the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) early in its inception.19
College teams play a minuscule fraction of the 118 other teams each season. This lack of round-robin format means that opponent strength for
each team varies wildly. Consequently, simple win-loss records insufficiently describe a team’s abilities, so sportswriters and coaches, respectively, must rank teams in the Associated Press (AP) and Coaches polls.
But humans are subject to biases.20
When computer polls rate each school’s performance, they treat each
game as a single observation and factor in the margin of victory and
whether the game was played at home or on the road. They also control
for opponent strength because midway through the season, each team
has played another team, which has played another, to the point that all
teams are interconnected by games—with plenty of redundancy. They
use a statistical method called regression analysis that allows them to
incorporate those variables simultaneously. Though imperfect, computer polls correct human biases. Their formulas are kept confidential
to avoid manipulation, but their results have invited peer review. Fair
and Oster have found that while averaging the rankings of six computer
polls used by the BCS created powerful predictive ability, they fared no
better than Las Vegas betting markets.21
The logic of the computer polls enables us to examine BYU’s historical performance. At this point, readers should be alerted that the
remainder of this subsection is the most technical portion of the article.
I follow the structure of computer polls by constructing a model with
each game as the unit of analysis, and use a HOME variable, with high (1),

19. The BCS was formed to match the best teams in games at the end of the
season.
20. Sportswriters tend to vote more favorably toward, among other things,
teams in their own states, and teams that won in games televised nationally. See
B. Jay Coleman, Andres Gallos, Paul M. Mason, and Jeffrey W. Steagall, “Voter
Bias in the Associated Press College Football Poll,” Journal of Sports Economics
11, no. 4 (2010): 397–417, doi:10.1177/1527002509346823.
21. Ray C. Fair and John F. Oster, “College Football Rankings and Market Efficiency,” Journal of Sports Economics 8, no. 1 (2007): 3–18, doi:10.1177
/1527002505276724.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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medium (0), and low (–1) to denote home, neutral, and road games,
respectively. The model differs from computer polls in that instead of
including all college football games in one season, I use only BYU games
across different seasons.
This difference creates two problems that need modifications to
maintain the same power of computer polls. First, because I include
only BYU games, its opponents are not interconnected by games to
control for opponent difficulty. Thus, I control for opponent strength
by incorporating the opponent’s final Massey ranking, available from
masseyratings.com. Second, because I include only BYU games across
seasons, the data are a time series instead of a cross-section like the
computer polls. To yield correct test statistics, Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), the bread and butter of regression modeling, requires the error
terms to be homoscedastic, and normally and independently distributed. Time-series data often violate this third requirement. If that is the
case, a different regression technique is required.
Using computer poll methodology, I construct an OLS model on the
552 games in which BYU has played from 1972, the year LaVell Edwards
became head coach, to the end of the 2015–16 season. The game results
are also available from masseyratings.com. I set margin of victory
(MOV) as the dependent variable, with binary explanatory variables
CROWTON and MENDENHALL (EDWARDS is the baseline), and HOME
and OPP_MASSEY_RANK as controls. I apply the Durbin-Watson (DW)
test to determine whether the error terms are independent as required.
A DW test statistic significantly different from 2 would lead one to reject
the null hypothesis that the errors are independent. The statistic is 1.6859
(p < .0001); accordingly, I replace the OLS with generalized least squares
(GLS), the method suited for autocorrelated data.22
Because how the error term in one game relates to the prior one is
unknown, I allow the model to determine that relationship empirically,
making the model empirical generalized least squares (EGLS).23 With
the same variables as the OLS, I construct the following EGLS model of
autoregressive order one, AR(1). This means that the error term in the
model for each game equals the error term of one prior game multiplied
by an empirically determined constant. Results of both regressions are
found in table 1.
22. Thomas P. Ryan, Modern Regression Methods, 2d ed. (Hoboken, N.J.:
Wiley, 2009), 68.
23. Jon Fox, Applied Regression Analysis and Generalized Linear Models, 2d
ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2008), 439–40.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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Table 1. Impact on Margin of Victory OLS vs. EGLS
OLS (1972–2015)
n = 552
–3.93132**

Coefficient
INTERCEPT

0.20677****

OPP_MASSEY_RANK

3.114411****

HOME
CROWTON
MENDENHALL

EGLS (1972–2015)
n = 552
–3.793561**
0.204785****
3.184117****

–9.79724***

–9.727855**

–2.61446

–2.577163

R /Pseudo-R

0.357

0.357

Proportion of Games
Correctly Predicted

0.786

0.783

4701.214

4686.212

2

2

Akaike Information Criterion

#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; ****p < .0001.

The values in the columns represent the effect the variables have
on margin of victory. Unsurprisingly, the OLS and EGLS have nearly
identical estimates; the OLS estimator on autocorrelated data, though
it yields incorrect test statistics, is still unbiased, like the GLS family.
The only qualitative difference between the OLS and EGLS is in the
coefficient CROWTON, significant at the 0.001 level in the OLS and
0.01 level in the EGLS. The control variables in this model are all highly
significant in the directions expected: easier opponents and home field
advantage resulted in larger margins of victory. Both models correctly
forecast the win-loss outcome of over 78 percent of games in the sample.
As measured by the R2 value (Pseudo-R2 for the EGLS), both models
explain 35.7 percent of the variation in MOV. The Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), which measures information loss in the models, favors
the EGLS. The error terms in the OLS model are strongly correlated,
theoretically throwing significance tests off, so I proceed with the EGLS.
The EGLS has a parameter relating the error term in this time period
(game in this case) to the previous one that the OLS does not, and equals
0.16828912 in this model. A question arises about whether the error
terms are correlated to not only one previous game but more. A model
in which the error term in one period is related to the ones in two prior
periods is the AR(2) model. I rerun the EGLS, assuming an AR(2) structure, and find the parameters for one and two prior periods to be 0.15897588
and 0.02503452, respectively. The correlation structure would be:
εg = 0.159εg−1 + 0.025εg−2 + νg

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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However, the 95 percent confidence interval for the second-order
parameter is [–0.05680647 0.1065413], which contains zero, indicating
that it is not statistically different from zero, providing rationale for discarding the AR(2) and keeping the AR(1) model, shown below:
MOVg =
−3.794 + 0.205OPPMASSEYg + 3.184HOMEg − 9.728CROWTONg + 0.168εg−1 + νg

The g denotes the current game and g–1 the prior game. Notice the MENDENHALL coefficient is insignificant. The computer polls, which produced this tool for evaluating teams, demonstrate that Mendenhall’s
performances roughly equaled that of Edwards’s. Some may counter
that this is unfair to Edwards because Edwards elevated the program
to national prominence. “BYU wasn’t BYU before LaVell,” captures this
claim. Mendenhall likewise inherited a team mired in consecutive losing seasons, but unlike Edwards, they were losing seasons with a storied
brand, and all the recruiting advantages that come with it. Edwards
deserves a grace period for this reason.
I rerun the regression and find the statistical equality between the
EDWARDS and MENDENHALL coefficients to be sensitive to changes
in the number of grace years. Granting Edwards just a one-year grace
period makes his performance statistically better than Mendenhall’s at
the 10 percent level (p = 0.0941). Extending the grace period to three
seasons makes Edwards’s performance statistically better than Mendenhall’s at the 5 percent level (p = 0.0470). Each iterative model can be
found in appendix B for one- to four-season grace periods, but I present
the models with zero-, one-, and three-year grace periods in table 2 to
show how the significance of MENDENHALL coefficient changes.
The model fit, both in terms of the variance explained and the winloss outcome of games in the sample correctly predicted, appears to
improve (though not monotonically) as we allow Edwards more time,
which suggests that granting Edwards the grace period is appropriate.
I do not support granting Mendenhall the same grace period both for
substantive reasons I listed above and because model fit deteriorates
when I do so. But Edwards’s performance remains better than Mendenhall’s even if I do. I include the would-be results in appendix B. Hence,
I arrive at the following predictive equation:
MOVg =
−2.901 + 0.208OPPMASSEYg + 3.173HOMEg − 10.811CROWTONg
− 3.798mendenhallg + 0.147εg−1 + νg

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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Table 2. EGLS-AR(1), Impact on Margin-of-Victory,
Grace Periods for LaVell Edwards
Variable

No Grace Period
(1972–2015)
n=552

INTERCEPT
OPP_MASSEY_RANK
HOME
CROWTON
MENDENHALL

εg−1

–3.793561**

Pseudo-R

% Games Predicted

–3.466628

3-Year Grace Period
(1975–2015)
n=518
–2.901024**

0.204785****

0.206912****

0.207504****

3.184117****

3.195950****

3.172963****

–9.727855**
–2.577163

–10.207137**

–10.811242***

–3.184314#

–3.798108*

0.1480461*

0.146773*

0.357

0.366

0.365

0.783

0.767

0.789

0.1624007*
2

1-Year Grace Period
(1973–2015)
n=541

#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; ****p < .0001.

The logic of computer polls allows us more apt comparisons of
BYU under different head coaches than polls that survey journalists or
coaches. The methods undergirding the computer polls enable performances to be adjusted for opponent difficulty and the home-away factor.
With those controls, I conclude that BYU football averaged 3.8 more
points in margin of victory under Edwards than under Mendenhall, and
10.8 more points under Edwards than under Crowton.
The “Blind Side” Thesis
In addition to evaluating teams, the analytics revolution also changed
how positions are valued. Quarterback (QB) has long been recognized
as the most important position. The center “snaps” the ball to the QB
to begin the play, and the QB decides what to do with the ball. Eyes
naturally follow the player holding the ball. A key discovery in the past
decade was that one particular offensive line (OL) position, the left
tackle (LT), who does not carry the ball but is tasked with protecting the
quarterback’s blind side, is second most important.
The rise of the LT’s value began when, as Alamar documented,
returns from passing rose over time.24 Average yards advanced from pass

24. Benjamin C. Alamar, “The Passing Premium Puzzle,” Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports 2, no. 4 (2006): article 5, doi:10.2202/1559-0410.1051.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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attempts increased from 4.66 in 1960 to 5.8 in 2005.25 Lewis explicated
the causal mechanism behind this rise in his popular book The Blind
Side. Coaches caught onto the fact that the extensive width of the football field can be exploited by having receivers spread out more, isolating
them, rendering them easier to throw to.26 Consequently, teams passed
more, causing a rise in the values of a QB’s longevity. Just as the insurance premium for an asset rises in tandem with the asset price, the price
of protection for a QB, the LT’s salary, increased. Previously undervalued,
the LT became recognized as the second-most important position in the
National Football League (NFL) and was paid accordingly.
Duly appreciated, the LT’s value drew analytical scrutiny. Alamar
and Weinstein-Gould calculated, using a convenience sample of seven
teams for each of three 2007 games, the relative contributions of each
of the five OLs at creating time in keeping defensive linemen (DLs) from
the QB’s space.27 Then they related the time created to the percentage of
throws the QB completed. They estimated that the New York Jets’ trade
of lineman Pete Kendall to the Washington football team for Adrien
Clarke resulted in their QB connecting three percentage points less of
his passes. Alamar and Goldner subsequently translated time created
for QBs into yards LTs advanced for their teams.28
Additionally, since the most important position is the passer, and the
second most important position is the lineman who protects his blind
side, it logically follows that the third most important position would
be the player on the other team trying to move past the LT and rush the
quarterback. In football, behind the DLs are linebackers (LBs). As Lewis
explained, in a 4–3 defense (four DLs and three LBs), the most common
alignment, the right defensive end (RDE) is the primary pass rusher.
But in the 3–4 defense (three DLs and four LBs), the outside linebacker
(OLB) is the primary pass rusher.29 Lewis portrayed OLB Lawrence
25. Alamar, “Passing Premium Puzzle,” 3.
26. Michael Lewis, The Blind Side: The Evolution of a Game (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2006; 2009), 103–14.
27. Benjamin C. Alamar and Jesse Weinstein-Gould, “Isolating the Effect
of Individual Linemen on the Passing Game in the National Football League,”
Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports 4, no. 2 (2008): article 10, doi:10.2202
/1559-0410.1113.
28. Benjamin C. Alamar and Keith Goldner, “The Blindside Project: Measuring the Impact of Individual Offensive Linemen,” Chance 24, no. 4 (2011):
25–29, doi:10.1080/09332480.2011.10739883.
29. Lewis, Blind Side, 127.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2016
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Taylor’s wreaking havoc on QBs as the driving force behind demand for
LTs.30 In light of this, I examine how BYU has fared in acquiring players
at these three most important positions.
The QB position has historically accrued fame for BYU. BYU QBs
have won the Heisman Trophy (Ty Detmer),31 two Super Bowl most
valuable player awards (Jim McMahon and Steve Young), and countless
other accolades. Today, QB remains a position rich in LDS talent. In the
past decade and a half, BYU landed two high-school QBs rated the best
nationally by recruiting agencies: Ben Olson of Thousand Oaks, California (2002), and Jake Heaps of Sammamish, Washington (2010). In
years where BYU did not sign the highest-rated QB in the nation, there
was little difference between the best and what BYU signed. The 2015
season was illustrative of the QB abundance BYU typically enjoys: After
the Heisman candidate Taysom Hill suffered a season-ending lisfranc
injury in the first game, he was replaced by Tanner Mangum, the comost valuable player with future Heisman-winner Jameis Winston at an
Elite 11 high school camp.
After acquiring QBs, developing them has been generally unproblematic. BYU has produced a continuous stream of NFL QBs since the
sunset of the golden LaVell Edwards era: Brandon Doman (2002, San
Francisco 49ers); John Beck (2006, Miami Dolphins); and Max Hall
(2010, Arizona Cardinals). A break occurred in the mid-2010s when
Heaps’s talent failed to materialize and Hill’s injury and resultant loss of
speed clouded his NFL chances. But with Mangum and 2015 St. George,
Utah, signee Kody Wilstead, who was also selected to participate in the
same Elite 11 QB camp, one can expect the stream of NFL quarterbacks
to continue. BYU operates close to its frontier at QB.
Like QB, OL is a position in which BYU has been historically strong.
Draft data from the Salt Lake Tribune’s Cougarstats.com show that from
1983 to 1999, twenty BYU OLs were drafted into either the NFL or the
now-defunct United States Football League, with the number of DLs
drafted a distant second (eight). The light has dimmed, however, with
only two more OLs drafted since. BYU has dropped from the optimum
at recruiting for the second most important position.
With the importance of LTs and DEs/OLBs in mind, I break down
how BYU has fared at acquiring the best players at those positions.
I include all LBs, DLs, and OLs, except centers. Centers snap the ball
30. Lewis, Blind Side, 15–27.
31. The Heisman Trophy is awarded annually to the best college player.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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through their legs to the QB and tend to be smaller and less interchangeable with other OLs. For the other positions, the best pass rusher plays
OLB/DE, regardless of where he played in high school. Data on recruits
are available from Scout.com from 2002 on. Due to BYU’s honor code
limitations, I restrict the investigation to LDS players to whom BYU has
offered a scholarship. I tabulate high school recruits ranked in the top
twenty-five at their positions, and junior college (JC) recruits ranked in
the top ten. Table 3 displays all the players who meet the criteria outlined above.
Most striking is the preponderance of Polynesian-lineage surnames
in table 3. Deploying a name method previously used to identify ethnic Asians on National Merit Scholars lists, combined with information
from Scout.com articles,32 I run frequencies in table 4. Polynesians in
this elite group opted to play elsewhere by a ratio of over two-to-one.
BYU missed on 64.1 percent of elite LDS recruits at the second and third
most important positions. However, a Fisher Exact Test of independence,
used to determine whether two groups are similar, shows insufficient
evidence that LDS athletes of Polynesian descent were less likely to sign
with BYU than those of non-Polynesian descent. This indicates that the
issue may be a general problem with recruiting players for the positions.
Of the total recruits at these positions BYU targeted, three-quarters
are of Polynesian descent. This figure represents the coordinate at which
sports, culture, and faith meet. Houghton has analyzed how the evolutionary development of muscular Polynesian physique was likely a product of natural selection for the oceanic environment.33 According to
Houghton, muscle tissue “allows for rapid variation in heat production,”
enabling Polynesians to survive both cold, windy, and wet m
 aritime
travel on one hand and hot life on land on the other.34 Large build combined with a warrior culture dovetail with football. Underwood has
documented the strong presence of Polynesians in the LDS Church and,
hence, in BYU football.35
32. See Ron Unz, “The Myth of American Meritocracy,” American Conservative, November 28, 2012, 19, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/
the-myth-of-american-meritocracy/.
33. Philip Houghton, “The Adaptive Significance of Polynesian Body Form,”
Annals of Human Biology 17, no. 1 (1990): 19–32, doi:10.1080/03014469000000752.
34. Houghton, “Adaptive Significance,” 28.
35. Grant Underwood, ed., Pioneers in the Pacific: Memory, History, Cultural
Identity among the Latter-day Saints (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 2005).
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Table 3. Elite LDS Linemen and Linebackers BYU Recruited
(Excluding Centers) 2002–15
Year

Players BYU Offered but Missed
Position (Rank) Name/School Enrolled

Players BYU Acquired
Position (Rank) Name

2002

DT (1) Haloti Ngata/Oregon
DE (5) J. T. Mapu/Tennesee
OL (20) Ryan Carter/Florida

DT (JC 6) Scott Young
OL (15) Jake Kuresa

2003

OL (2) Ofa Mohetau
DT (16) Brian Soi

2004

OL (JC 1) Taitusi Lutui/USC

2005

DE (JC 5) C. J. Ah You/Oklahoma
LB (11) Kaluka Maiava/USC
OL (1) Adam Hawes/Arizona State

2006

OL (JC 2) Fenuki Tupou/Oregon
DT (17) Sione Fua/Stanford

OL (8) Matt Reynolds

2007
2008

DT (25) Sealver Siliga/Utah
OLB (9) Uona Kaveinga/USC

DT (JC 2) Tevita Hola
DT (JC 9) Bernard Afutiti

2009

OLB (1) Manti Te’o/Notre Dame
OG (3) Xavier S’ua Filo/UCLA
MLB (17) L. T. Filiaga/Utah
DT (15) Latu Heimuli/Utah

OLB (11) Kyle Van Noy

2010

DT (10) Ricky Heimuli/Oregon

MLB (8) Zac Stout
OT (11) Graham Rowley
DE (19) Bronson Kaufusi

OLB (23) Vince Biegel/Wisconsin
OG (21) Brandon Fanaika/Stanford

DE (23) Troy Hinds
MLB (21) Butch Pau’u

2011
2012
2013

OG (16) Brayden Kearsley

2014

OG (2) Damien Mama/USC
OG (5) Viane Talamaivao/USC
DT (6) Bryan Mone/Michigan

2015

OG (2) Tristen Hoge/Notre Dame
OG (8) Christian Folau/Oregon State
DT (5) Breiden Fehoko/Texas Tech
OG (14) Semisi Uluave/California

MLB: Middle Linebacker; DT: Defensive Tackle (one of the DL); OG: Offensive
Guard (one of the OL); OT: Offensive Tackle (one of the OL).

Table 4. Frequency of Elite LDS Potential Recruits by Heritage
Missed
Non-Polynesian

Acquired

4 (10.3%)

Total

6 (15.4%)

10 (25.6%)

Polynesian

21 (53.8%)

8 (20.5%)

29 (74.4%)

Total

25 (64.1%)

14 (35.9%)

39 (100.0%)
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Harnessing the perceived abilities of a talented subpopulation has
precedents. Morris detailed how the Taiwanese government saw the
“physical gifts” of the country’s Austronesian natives and expended
funds to “excavate” their talent for the national baseball team.36 Though
less than 2 percent of Taiwan’s population, the aboriginals comprised
eleven of the twenty-five players on the baseball squad at the 2004
Athens Olympics, and the first two Taiwanese players in Major League
Baseball.37
BYU enjoys a structural advantage with Polynesian-heritage prospects: it can reap economies of scale in recruitment. Although Polynesians constitute an enormous proportion of college football players
relative to their population, only a few other schools, like USC, can find it
economical to direct their resources to this demographic. The outgoing
BYU staff ’s infrastructure built by Mendenhall and his management
consultant, Paul Gustavson, doubtlessly employed an approach others
could not replicate. In fact, at the heart of its organizational philosophy
was an idea found in Porter’s “What Is Strategy?”38 Porter argued that a
firm must be doing something no one else is doing, or doing something
differently from what other firms are doing. Otherwise, competitors
would copy its strategy and erode its advantage. As Porter explained,
“A company can outperform rivals only if it can establish a difference
that it can preserve.”39
Mendenhall and Gustavson pursued nonreplicable strategies by
(1) exploiting the maturity and leadership skills of returned-missionary
players through assigning them responsibilities usually assumed by
coaches and staff, such as conducting practices and organizing off-field
events;40 (2) channeling BYU’s uniquely religious nature as a higher
purpose to ignite players to “play from the deepest place possible [their
faith];”41 and (3) taking advantage of the BYU Honor Code and the
resultant lower levels of toxins in players’ bodies by implementing
endurance-training methods that coaches believed would help BYU
36. Andrew D. Morris, Colonial Project, National Game: A History of Baseball in Taiwan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 80.
37. Morris, Colonial Project, National Game, 165.
38. Michael E. Porter, “What Is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review 74, no. 6
(1996): 61–78.
39. Porter, “What Is Strategy?” 62.
40. Paul Gustavson and Alison von Feldt, Running into the Wind: Bronco
Mendenhall—5 Strategies for Building a Successful Team (Salt Lake City: Shadow
Mountain, 2012), 120.
41. Gustavson and von Feldt, Running into the Wind, 227.
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outlast opponents.42 How Mendenhall and Gustavson interacted with
BYU’s unique demographic endowment is unclear. It is known that
Crowton conducted luaus for potential recruits.43
Recent coaching changes should help BYU in recruiting Polynesian
players. During the writing of this article, Mendenhall accepted the
position of head coach at the University of Virginia, and BYU hired
Kalani Sitake in mid-December 2015 to replace him. The affable Sitake
is known for his recruiting prowess. Upon his hiring, athletic director
Tom Holmoe said of him, “He is an outstanding leader and coach, an
exceptional recruiter.”44 Though Tongan-American, Sitake remarked,
“I’m kind of offended when they say I’m a Polynesian recruiter. Some
players happen to be Polynesian, some African-American, some white.
I value all of them. I’m just a coach who happens to be Polynesian.”45
Sitake’s statement is true enough. Nonetheless, one would still expect
Sitake to help in recruiting this talented demographic. Mirabile and
Witte, in the most comprehensive study on college football recruiting to
date (more on this below), found that a series of variables that relate the
recruit to a particular school, which they dubbed the “affinity cohort,”
significantly influenced the likelihood a recruit would sign.46 Among
them was whether the recruit had family ties to the school. For mid- and
high-rated recruits, family ties tripled the probability a recruit would
choose the school.47 Considering the affinity factor, one would expect
Sitake’s ties to the Polynesian community to make a difference.
In summary, ideas of the analytics revolution have led to the conclusion that Edwards outperformed Mendenhall who outperformed Crowton; that BYU’s historical overachievement for its talent level has been
42. See Trevor Matich, interview by Spencer Linton and Jarom Jordan, BYU
Sports Nation, BYUTV, September 14, 2015, available on YouTube, https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=-kbbYwT4V5o.
43. See Bruce Feldman, “A Recruiting Pitch of Another Kind,” ESPN, May 28,
2002, http://espn.go.com/gen/s/2002/0527/1387550.html.
44. Thomas A. Holmoe, in “Sitake Comes Home,” BYU Magazine (Winter
2016): 8.
45. Doug Robinson, “Kalani Sitake: ‘The Protector’ Puts Family, Cougars,
under His Wing,” Deseret News, March 25, 2016, http://www.deseretnews.com/
article/865650869/Kalani-Sitake-The-Protector-puts-family-Cougars-under
-his-wing.html?pg=all.
46. McDonald Paul Mirabile and Mark David Witte, “A Discrete-Choice
Model of a College Football Recruit’s Program Selection Decision,” Journal of
Sports Economics (2015): 1–28, doi:10.1177/1527002514566278.
47. Mirabile and Witte, “Discrete-Choice Model,” 17.
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due to its concentration of talent in the most important positions; that
currently, BYU performs near what is possible in recruiting passers,
but not those who protect the passer’s blind side nor those pressuring
opposing passers.
Recruiting
Sitake’s recruiting skill stems from personality and effort. That does not
mean the analytics cannot identify factors that affect the probability a
targeted recruit will sign. Unlike professional sports, wherein teams
draft incoming players from the level below, college teams must convince high schoolers, who voluntarily sign with any program that has
offered them a scholarship, to choose them. Hence, the rise of analytics
would naturally launch numerous studies on college recruiting. Valuable to BYU are papers that predict whether a prospect will sign with
a particular school. DuMond, Lynch, and Platania authored the first
paper of this kind.48 They used a conditional probit model based on
Rivals.com data and found that a school’s AP ranking the prior year,
membership in a BCS conference, whether or not the school has a bowl
ban, stadium capacity, and a tier-one academic ranking, among other
variables, affected the likelihood a recruit would sign.
Subsequently, Mirabile and Witte improved on the model of DuMond
and his coauthors with a study of their own, mentioned above. They
used eleven years of data (2002–12), compared to three for DuMond.49
This gave Mirabile and Witte a total of 19,815 players and 113,384 schools.
By comparison, the DuMond sample contained 3,395 players and
13,394 schools. The larger sample size enabled Mirabile and Witte to
partition the sample into three—one for lower-rated recruits (rated two
stars), one for mid-rated recruits (three stars), and one for higher-rated
recruits (four or five stars). DuMond and his coauthors merely included
the rating as a covariate.50 This difference is important because recruits
of differing qualities exhibit different preferences. For instance, Mirabile and Witte found that lower-rated recruits value academics more
strongly in their decisions.51 The data and models the two studies used
48. J. Michael DuMond, Allen K. Lynch, and Jennifer Platania, “An Economic Model of the College Football Recruiting Process,” Journal of Sports
Economics 9, no. 1 (2008): 67–87, doi:10.1177/1527002506298125.
49. Mirabile and Witte, “Discrete-Choice Model,” 8.
50. DuMond, Lynch, and Platania, “Economic Model,” 77.
51. Mirabile and Witte, “Discrete-Choice Model,” 20.
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were similar: Mirabile and Witte used data from Scout.com; DuMond
and his coauthors used data from Rivals.com, both top recruiting sites;
the former used a conditional logit regression, the latter a conditional
probit.52 Both probit and logit have binary dependent variables; the
probit assumes the data to be normally distributed, logit log-normally.
Both models find that, counter to prevailing wisdom, a school’s NFL
placement ability had no effect on recruits.53 Thus BYU’s recent poor
NFL output numbers should not constitute a pressing concern. Mirabile
and Witte found a host of other statistically significant variables, many
with implications for BYU. Due to space limitations, I focus on just one
with a large coefficient: membership in a BCS conference.
Both models also found a school’s BCS (now P5) membership to be a
statistically significant factor.54 Mirabile and Witte discovered that a prospect is 31 percent more likely to choose a P5 school over a non-P5 school.55
Currently, BYU plays as a football independent unaffiliated with a conference. Mendenhall and Holmoe have expressed desires for P5 inclusion.
Holmoe recognized that the widening resource gap between the P5 and
G5 would diminish BYU’s ability to compete.56 BYU neared prospective P5 status when the Big XII conference announced it was seeking to
expand membership on July 19, 2016. But after a long, drawn-out selection process, the conference publicly reversed course on October 17 of the
same year.57
52. Mirabile and Witte, “Discrete-Choice Model,” 15.
53. Mirabile and Witte, “Discrete-Choice Model,” 15; DuMond, Lynch, and
Platania, “Economic Model of the College Football Recruiting Process,” 79.
54. The BCS conferences represent the top tier of college football. This club has
been renamed the “Power Five” (P5). The second tier is the “Group of Five” (G5).
55. Mirabile and Witte, “Discrete-Choice Model,” 17.
56. Quoted in Jerry Hinnen, “BYU AD Tom Holmoe: ‘Intention’ Is to Find
Power Five Home in ‘Near Future,’ ” CBS Sports, February 25, 2015, http://www
.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/25081119/byu-ad-tom
-holmoe-intention-is-to-find-power-5-home-in-near-future.
57. At the time of the July 19 announcement, BYU was widely held to be
the leading candidate to join the conference. See Jake Trotter, “Houston, BYU
Especially Would Add to Big 12’s Athletics,” ESPN, August 11, 2016, http://www
.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/17271490/many-big-12-expansion-can
didates-actually-bolster-football-play. But BYU’s inclusion faced opposition
from LGBT advocates who believed the Honor Code was discriminatory. Many
in the sports media reported that once BYU was eliminated from consideration,
conference expansion was not nearly so attractive, so the university presidents
opted to remain pat and receive more money from their television partners
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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The growth of analytics produced predictive models of player
recruitment, enabling teams to identify factors that influence where a
high school player chooses to play at the collegiate level. Preeminent
among the findings was that membership in a P5 conference would help
BYU’s chances with signing a high school athlete by roughly 31 percent.
Exclusion from a P5 conference will also leave BYU with a wealth gap
vis-à-vis P5 members.
BYU Football Responds to the Revolution I:
Mendenhall and analytics
The analytics revolution has not pervaded every team equally. Baumer and Zimbalist found that as of 2012, four major league baseball
teams—Atlanta, Colorado, Miami, and Philadelphia—had no frontoffice employees devoted to analytics.58 Alamar added that even among
teams known to use analytics, the sophistication in their use varies.59
Davenport, in an industry white paper, classified analytic practices into
two categories: “table stakes” analytics, which are becoming commonplace in sports, and “frontier” analytics, used aggressively by only a few
teams.60 Table stakes analytics relevant to college football include external data sources, descriptive analytics on players, game simulations, and
game-tactic analysis. “Frontier” analytics include video motion-capture
data, locational/biometric data, open data analysis by fans, engaging
players in analytics, and gathering and using proprietary data.61 Where
does BYU football fall on this spectrum? None outside the program can
definitely say. Due to obvious competitive reasons, teams often maintain
secrecy about their analytic practices. For instance, Neuroscout LLC,
a company that uses EEG machines to measure how quickly batters
instead. See Pete Thamel, “Big 12 Decides Not to Expand Conference,” Sports
Illustrated, October 17, 2016, http://www.si.com/college-football/2016/10/17/
big-12-expansion-proposal-rejected. The growing assertiveness of LGBT advocacy is something BYU and other Church-affiliated institutions must engage in
the foreseeable future, whether or not the reports are correct.
58. Baumer and Zimbalist, Sabermetric Revolution, 26.
59. Benjamin C. Alamar, Sports Analytics: A Guide for Coaches, Managers,
and Other Decision Makers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 13.
60. Thomas H. Davenport, Analytics in Sports: The New Science of Winning
(Portland, Ore.: International Institute for Analytics, 2014), 6–7, http://www
.sas.com/content/dam/SAS/en_us/doc/whitepaper2/iia-analytics-in-sports
-106993.pdf.
61. Davenport, Analytics in Sports, 16.
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recognize pitches, services unnamed Major League Baseball teams.62
BYU statistics professor Shane Reese has advised several of the school’s
sports programs, including basketball,63 and has offered his services to
Mendenhall.64 Mendenhall expressed interest but did not meet with
Reese again. Not until seven years later did Mendenhall meet with
members of the statistics department.65 After he left BYU and took the
head coaching position at the University of Virginia, his new athletic
director, Craig Littlepage, described him as “data-driven.”66 Ava Wallace of the Washington Post wrote on December 7, 2015, that Mendenhall
“likes advanced statistics and depends on behavioral organization to
implement his system.”67
Involving Players in Analytics
Davenport said that one approach to analytics is to involve players.68
BYU’s connection to analytics began long before Mendenhall. Former
BYU and NFL quarterback Virgil Carter published the first known
paper on football analytics in 1970. In “Technical Notes—Operations
Research on Football,” he divided the football field into ten-yard increments and calculated the expected points scored from each of those
locations on the field. Expected points would equal a touchdown (seven
62. Larry Greenmeier, “‘Neuroscout’ Gets into Batters’ Heads to Rate Hitters,” Scientific American, July 1, 2014, http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/neuro-scout-gets-into-batters-heads-to-rate-hitters/.
63. Steven Potter, “The Numbers Game: BYU Rolls with Sports Analytics
Trend,” Daily Universe, May 8, 2014, http://universe.byu.edu/2014/05/08/2015
0223the-numbers-game-byu-rolls-with-sports-analytics-trend/.
64. Tad Walch, “Could a Statistical Model Detect Cheating NBA Ref?”
Deseret News, August 16, 2007, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695201262/
Could-a-statistical-model-detect-cheating-NBA-ref.html?pg=all.
65. Emily Hellewell, “Statistics MVP: Grad Student Rates College Athletes,”
BYU News, April 12, 2016, https://news.byu.edu/news/statistics-mvp-grad-student
-rates-college-athletes.
66. Craig Littlepage, “Bronco Mendenhall Introductory Press Conference
Transcript” (Press Conference, John Paul Jones Arena, December 7, 2015), Virginia: University of Virginia—Official Athletics Website, http://www.virginia
sports.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/120715aaj.html.
67. Ava Wallace, “What’s His Story? Bronco Mendenhall Explains Himself
at Virginia,” Washington Post, December 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/sports/colleges/whats-his-story-bronco-mendenhall-explains-himself
-at-virginia/2015/12/07/62becf8e-9d2e-11e5-bce4-708fe33e3288_story.html.
68. Davenport, Analytics in Sports, 9.
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points), field goal (FG, three points), or safety (two points), multiplied
by the percentage of times teams ended up scoring in drives from that
portion of the field, minus the same for the opponent.69 Particularly telling was Carter’s description of the data-collection methodology: “Each
of the 8,373 individual plays in these games was coded, punched, and
entered into a computer, and all analyses were made on this database.”70
At the time of punch card computers, a BYU graduate was involved in
football analytics. Four decades later, large online databases would give
rise to the analytics revolution, and Carter’s methodology became the
basis of the Romer, White and Berry, and Knowlton and Fellingham
papers to be examined further in this section.
When Carter’s paper was published in 1970, he was no longer a member of the BYU football team with a stake in its success. But at least one
player has been involved in analytics while playing football at BYU. In
the Mendenhall era, two eventual NFL DEs majored in statistics: Ezekiel
Ansah and Bronson Kaufusi. Ansah was drafted in the first round as
the fifth selection in 2013, Kaufusi in the third round in 2016. Kaufusi’s
emphasis was in analytics, and he was involved in an analytics project
for the team.71 His involvement showed the program has adopted the
“frontier” analytic practice of engaging players in the process.
Points Scored
There is no evidence that Mendenhall was instrumental in involving
Kaufusi, but Mendenhall did demonstrate awareness of statistics. In Running into the Wind, we read: “As early as Bronco’s first spring as head coach,
he and his staff sought to pinpoint the game performance measures most
closely correlated with winning. Building on some early research by the
team under former head coach Gary Crowton, they studied twenty years
of Cougar football and then college football as a whole to uncover the
top ten statistics that indicate success. They aimed with laser-precision at
finding the absolutely most crucial metrics.”72 The book does not mention what those metrics were. Fortunately, we can know more by matching the passage in the book to a speech Mendenhall relayed to the team:
69. Virgil Carter and Robert E. Machol, “Technical Notes—Operations
Research on Football,” Operations Research 19, no. 2 (1971): 541–44, doi:10.1287/
opre.19.2.541.
70. Carter and Machol, “Operations Research on Football,” 541.
71. Bronson Kaufusi, conversation with author, May 29, 2016.
72. Gustavson and von Feldt, Running into the Wind, 135.
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“So we did our own little study, and not surprisingly, points scored was
number one. Then points allowed was number two. Then, so all we tried
to do was then say, OK, what mark was common amongst the team? And
I wanted to give something tangible to our players. And that number
happened to be twenty-four points, again, at BYU since the beginning of
LaVell’s era all the way until now, and it held again.”73
Embedded within his statement is a clip of Mendenhall telling players that when BYU scored over twenty-four points, the team won 90 percent of the time. Winning is, by definition, scoring more points than
one’s opponent, so when Wallace said that Mendenhall liked “advanced
statistics,” she was probably talking about something other than “points
scored.” Later, I will discuss the program adopting a more useful system
that computes how much each play contributes to points scored.
Execution
The Mendenhall-Gustavson regime emphasized execution over schematics. A full corpus of Mendenhall’s quotes on this matter will not be
retrieved. But the Broncoism “execute at a higher level” encapsulates
this philosophy, which has empirical grounding: “Bronco and his staff
were familiar with a study commissioned by Robert Kraft, the owner
of the New England Patriots. The study found that only three to five
plays per game really separate football dynasties from average teams.
Although the researchers had expected that talent would be the factor
that made the difference in those few plays, they discovered instead that
the advantage went to the team with the most accurate execution of the
planned play.”74 Mendenhall and Gustavson were holding team execution above individual talent. But the program exalted execution over
in-game strategy as well. In this regard, whether it was wise for them
to generalize based on an NFL study requires more investigation. Playcalling in the NFL is more homogeneous, meaning less wiggle room for
strategy than in the NCAA. ESPN.com data from 2010 to 2015 show that
NCAA teams passed the ball on an average of 45.1 percent of plays from
scrimmage, with the middle half of the distribution spanning 40.9 percent to 50.5 percent. NFL teams from the same period passed the ball
an average of 56.3 percent of the time, but its middle half of the distribution spanned 53.2 percent to 59.8 percent. The interquartile range is
73. Bronco Mendenhall, quoted in “Inside BYU Football (9/15/15),” BYUTV,
September 15, 2015, http://www.byutv.org/watch/6596bb35-92c4-4b71-8945
-e465f2918152/inside-byu-football-inside-byu-football-91515.
74. Gustavson and von Feldt, Running into the Wind, 156.
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9.6 percentage points for NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) teams
and just 6.6 percentage points for NFL teams. An F-test for variance,
used to determine whether the spreads of two groups are equal, shows
that the variance in pass percentage was higher for the NCAA FBS than
that for the NFL with high certainty (p < 0.0001). More room for strategy exists for college; thus the primacy of execution in the NFL may not
apply in college.
Penalties
Another Mendenhall-Gustavson application of statistics is found in the
attitude toward penalties. Facing local media concerns over the high
number of penalties BYU had been incurring, Mendenhall said, “As I
have said many times before, I don’t see a correlation, at least a statistical correlation, between penalties and wins and losses. As [of] a few
weeks ago, ourselves, TCU, and Utah were in the bottom of the league
in penalties. Some of that comes with aggressive play. I don’t condone it,
but I would rather [not] be holding our players back than having them
play too cautious.”75
What Mendenhall said here is that the three winningest teams in the
Mountain West Conference were also the most penalized. He even elucidated the cause: actively avoiding penalties resulted in timid play. This
also applies to the NFL. As Michael Salfino notes on January 28, 2015, in
the Wall Street Journal, in 2014 the two Super Bowl teams, New England
and Seattle, ranked second and first in penalties committed, respectively.
This phenomenon held the year before; Super Bowl champion Baltimore
and runner-up San Francisco were first and second in penalties committed, respectively. The most successful teams racked up the most violations.
Mendenhall and Salfino singled out teams atop the success distribution. Hauge studied all NFL teams from 1995 to 2009, and obtained contradictory results.76 In two separate regressions with only one variable
each, she found a negative relationship between a team’s winning percentage and its number of penalties in one regression and its penalty

75. Jillian Williams, “Mendenhall: We Are Anxious to Come Back Home
and Play” (Press Conference, October 6, 2008, updated October 20, 2008), The
Official Home of the BYU Cougars, http://byucougars.com/m-football/menden
hall-we-are-anxious-come-back-home-and-play.
76. Janice Hauge, “Incentive for Aggression in American Football,” in Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests: Economics, History, and Policy, ed.
R. Todd Jewell (New York: Springer, 2011).
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yards accrued in another.77 In a third regression, she threw egregious
penalties into the regression and concluded, “winning percentage is
negatively correlated with both the number of offensive penalties and
the total number of yards in offensive penalties. . . . Offensive penalties attributed to severe infractions has a negative and statistically significant effect on winning percentage, although the same is not true of
defensive penalties.”78
Hauge constructed two more models, using penalties to explain
points scored and allowed. She found that if a team incurred fewer penalties than opponents, they tended to score more points. If they incurred
more penalties than their opponents, they allowed more points.79
Informed football fans know that factors other than penalties affect
winning and scoring. From a statistical standpoint, that Hauge failed
to control for them in all her regressions leads to omitted variable bias.
Winston, who advised the National Basketball Association’s (NBA) Dallas Mavericks, offered analysis that not only corrected this deficiency,
but would better adjudicate Mendenhall’s belief about penalties because
it used NCAA data.80 Winston gathered yards per run, yards per pass,
and penalty and turnover differences for all games involving the 128
NCAA FBS teams in 2014 as explanatory variables in an OLS regression on margin of victory.81 He found all variables to have statistically
significant impacts on margin of victory except penalty differential. This
result, derived from more applicable and more granular data (because
it used games as observations instead of seasons) and better methods
by including proper control variables, justifies Mendenhall’s distaste for

77. Hauge, “Incentive for Aggression,” 40.
78. Hauge, “Incentive for Aggression,” 39; emphasis in original. Hauge
defined as “severe” penalties ten yards and over. Strangely, she included “points
for” and “points against” as control variables in this regression. I leave it to the
reader to interpret her result: penalties hurt a team’s winning percentage apart
from how many points it scores and allows.
79. Hauge, “Incentive for Aggression,” 42.
80. Wayne L. Winston, “Lecture 45—5.4 What Makes NFL Teams Win?”
(lecture, University of Houston, September 9, 2016), Coursera, https://www.
coursera.org/learn/mathematics-sport/lecture/KogT1/5-4-what-makes-nfl
-teams-win. Although the title of the lecture references the NFL, Winston
directed the audience to an NCAA dataset and regression results, both available from the author upon request.
81. The aforementioned P5 AND G5 tiers form the upper-division FBS.
Below the FBS is the lower-division Football Championship Series (FCS).
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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excessive attention to penalties and demonstrates his in-game tactical
analysis to be consistent with analytics.
Biometric Data
In addition to Mendenhall’s statements, the program’s use of playertracking technology offers clues on the intensity with which it adopted
advanced statistics. The Mendenhall-Gustavson regime availed itself of
biometric data. I mentioned earlier that the regime exploited the health
benefits of the BYU Honor Code for perceived advantages in athletic
performance. In the interview through which we know this, Matich
also said that staff members “use high technology to train and monitor very closely the actual physiological state of players’ bodies under
stress. And they’re able to take that up to the point to where they can get
the maximum conditioning out of it, without going over and having it
become detrimental.”82 The program under Mendenhall was adopting
a “frontier” analytic practice by employing this sophisticated biometric
program.
Fourth-Down Decisions
One can also assess whether Mendenhall was adopting analytics through
his observable behavior. Among the best-known studies in the past
decade has been Romer’s paper about fourth-down decision-making.83
When a team has the ball, it is given four plays, or “downs,” to advance
ten yards, after which it is given four more downs. If the team fails, it
relinquishes the ball to the opponent at the spot where it failed. If it does
not believe it can advance whatever is remaining of the ten yards on the
last down, it can opt to punt the ball away to the opponent, forcing the
opponent to start from an inferior position. It can also opt to kick a field
goal (kicking the ball through the goalposts behind the end zone for
three points). Punting and kicking are considered safer strategies than
“going for it” (attempting to gain four more downs by advancing).
Using dynamic scoring, a method typically employed to predict the
impact of economic policies, Romer examined all fourth-down situations by NFL teams from 2009 to 2011 in the first three quarters of
games. Based on the “expected points” concept by Carter, he found that
82. Matich, interview.
83. David Romer, “Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football,” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 2 (2006): 340–65, doi:10.1086/501171.
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coaches took the safer route far more frequently than optimal. Of the
1,068 times it was optimal for the team to “go for it,” coaches did so only
109 times.84
One can infer whether Mendenhall was aware of this widely known
finding by examining his fourth-down behavior. Romer did not provide
the optimal strategy for every situation on the field, against which to compare Mendenhall’s decisions. Fortunately, a similar study by Burke and
Quealy did.85 They employed the same methodology as Romer, except
with more data. Play-by-play data for Mendenhall’s games are available
from ESPN.com and BYUCougars.com. Mendenhall faced 306 fourthdown situations in the first three quarters of games, with 15 or fewer
yards to go to convert, in which it is optimal to “go for it.” As seen on
table 5, he “went for it” 102 times, a frequency of exactly one-third. I use
a two-sample proportion test to determine whether his percentage was
higher than that of NFL coaches. It was, with high certainty (p < 0.0001).
To examine whether Mendenhall was operating optimally less than all
the time, I use the exact binomial test, designed to determine whether
observations are different from a theoretical expectation. His percentage
was far less than 100 percent (p < 0.0001). So while he was subject to risk
aversion like any other coach, he acted optimally over three times more
frequently than the average NFL coach, indicating awareness of Romer’s
study and the adoption of in-game tactical analysis.
Table 5. Comparative Fourth-Down Decision-Making
Situations in which Times the Coach
“Going for it” on
“Went for It” in
Fourth Down is
Those Situations
Optimal
NFL Coaches 2009–11
Mendenhall 2005–15

Frequency

1068

109

10.2%

306

102

33.3%

Icing the Kicker
Another indicator of how intensely Mendenhall applied analytics is in
his engaging in a practice known as “icing the kicker.” Before the opposing team kicks a field goal (FG), coaches often call a time out or two to
84. Romer, “Do Firms Maximize?” 354.
85. Brian Burke and Kevin Quealy, “How Coaches and the NYT FourthDown Bot Compare,” New York Times, November 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.com/newsgraphics/2013/11/28/fourth-downs/post.html.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol55/iss4/5
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inflict anxiety on the kicker by forcing him to contemplate his upcoming
kick, in hopes that this will decrease the probability the kicker converts
the FG. Mendenhall stirred controversy in the 2014 bowl game, when he
consumed his two remaining timeouts to do this when opponent University of Memphis was facing a point-after-touchdown (PAT) attempt,
which was considered a “chip shot” that succeeded with little variation.
To examine whether icing works, Berry and Wood collected data
on all 2003 NFL FG attempts from 2002–3 for a logistic regression with
physical and psychological variables surrounding the kicker, including
whether the kicker was iced.86 In a logistic regression, the dependent
variable is binary—in this case, 1 if the kick was made, 0 if not. The
study found that icing lowered the likelihood of success by 46.5 percent (p = 0.03).87 Before concluding that Mendenhall’s act is consistent
with analytics, two things require consideration. First, when the authors
decomposed the data by kick length, they found that “icing” had the
largest impact among FGs from 31 to 50 yards. For FGs thirty yards and
under, there were only five iced attempts recorded and four of them
were made. Since a PAT equates to a FG of 20 yards, it belongs in this
category, so nothing can be said about Mendenhall’s decision to ice a
PAT attempt. The sample size for short FGs was simply too small.
Second, the sample size of the entire study was questioned. Moskowitz and Wertheim noticed that Berry and Wood’s dataset contained only
thirty-eight incidences in which the kicker was iced, and followed up by
extending the data from 2001 to 2009.88 They found that icing made no
statistically significant difference. The bulk of the evidence suggests that
icing does not work, so Mendenhall’s decision to ice indicated he is not
aware of these studies.
Overall, Mendenhall’s attitude and actions in regard to points, execution, penalties, player development, fourth-down decisions, and “icing,”
demonstrated that, although not “all-in,” he incorporated analytics in
his decision-making to a substantial degree. He acted more optimally
than the average NFL coach, adopted sophisticated player-tracking technology, and harbored a counterintuitive yet justifiable attitude toward

86. Scott M. Berry and Craig Wood, “The Cold-Foot Effect,” Chance 17,
no. 4 (2004): 47–51, doi:10.1080/09332480.2004.10554926.
87. Berry and Wood, “Cold-Foot Effect,” 51.
88. Tobias J. Moskowitz and L. Jon Wertheim, Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences behind How Sports Are Played and Games Are Won (New York: Crown
Archetype, 2012), 213–14.
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penalties. Mendenhall’s record, combined with a player’s involvement
in analytics, show that the program did not let the analytics revolution
pass by unnoticed during his tenure.
BYU Football Responds to the Revolution II:
New Staff and Analytics
Mendenhall’s departure means it is also important to examine the
value the incoming staff has accorded analytics. Clues from the short
duration the regime has been in place indicate that receptiveness varies among high-level individual coaches. Sitake appears open-minded
about analytics, while the views of new offensive coordinator Ty Detmer
are unknown.
Advanced Player Metrics
Sitake’s periodic meetings with Zachary Knowlton, a BYU graduate
student in statistics, furnish evidence that Sitake welcomed analytics.
Knowlton reported that Sitake was “really, really open to what we can do
to help,” and that he helped Sitake “relate player production to points.”89
Novel statistics for translating performances into points are among the
innovations of the analytics revolution. Bill James broke ground in 1979
with a simple but powerfully predictive runs created formula equating runs to the outcomes batters produce, namely hits, singles, doubles,
triples, home runs, walks, and hits-by-pitch.90
With runs created, James determined the impact of those outcomes
intuitively. Lindsey constructed a more precise formula based on how
much the batter changed the expected number of runs with those

89. Zachary Knowlton, interview by Spencer Linton and Jason Shepherd,
BYU Sports Nation, BYUTV, April 27, 2016, available on Youtube, https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=R5Ck2uQPLDM. Knowlton completed his master’s
degree in April 2016 and is no longer involved in BYU sports analytics.
90. Wayne L. Winston, Mathletics: How Gamblers, Managers, and Sports
Enthusiasts Use Mathematics in Baseball, Basketball, and Football (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 11–12. Points are called “runs” in baseball because players run through three “bases” in a diamond-shaped path to
score. A validation study showed teams’ runs created predicted run scoring
within 14.6 percent, compared to 31.7 percent for the traditional metric of batting average. See Jim Albert and Jay Bennett, Curve Ball: Baseball, Statistics, and
the Role of Chance in the Game (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2001; 2003), 230.
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outcomes.91 To illustrate: A player goes to bat with a runner on first
base and one out. In that situation, teams score an average of 0.498 runs
before the end of the half-inning.92 If he hits a single and the runner
moves to third base, there are now runners on first and third bases with
one out. In this new state, teams score an expected 1.115 more runs by
the half-inning’s end. The batter contributed 1.115 – 0.498 = 0.617 runs
by hitting that single. Note Lindsey could measure a player’s contribution to scoring without anyone’s having scored. Thereby outcomes of
every play have scoring values attached, even those where no scoring
occurred.
White and Berry did likewise for the NFL by calculating the expected
points scored from every scenario on the field and deriving a player’s
value from how much his action changed those points.93 To explain, the
authors provided this illustrative scenario: Teams with the ball on third
down with five yards remaining from converting a first down at ten
yards from the end zone score 3.9 expected points, that is, an average of
3.9 points. If the QB throws a touchdown pass from that spot for 7 points,
he contributes 7 – 3.9 = 3.1 points.94 If the opponent intercepts the throw
and scores a touchdown, the QB contributes (–7) – 3.9 = –10.9 points.
To compute the expected points used above, White and Berry ran a
polychotomous regression, which allows for a finite number of discrete
dependent variable values and thereby fits the seven discrete scoring
outcomes in football: touchdowns, FGs and safeties scored and allowed,
and no scoring. Their respective points are {7, –7, 3, –3, 2, –2, 0}. They
set yards from the goal line and yards remaining to convert a first down
as continuous variables and second, third, and fourth downs as binary
variables (with first down as the baseline) that explain the seven outcomes. Expected points from a particular down-distance-position state
equal the aggregate impact on scoring of down, distance from converting back to first down, and field position of that state.

91. George R. Lindsey, “An Investigation of Strategies in Baseball,” Operations Research 11, no. 4 (1963): 477–501, doi:10.1287/opre.11.4.477.
92. Lindsey, “Investigation of Strategies,” 485.
93. Chris White and Scott Berry, “Tiered Polychotomous Regression: Ranking NFL Quarterbacks,” American Statistician 56, no. 1 (2002): 10–21, doi:10
.1198/000313002753631312.
94. White and Berry, “Tiered Polychotomous Regression,” 11.
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Knowlton and Fellingham replicated White and Berry’s work on
NCAA data, also using a polychotomous regression.95 Then Knowlton
presented this work to Mendenhall,96 and later to Sitake,97 integrating it with grades the coaches gave players on tasks he assigned them.
Coaches give each player a plus-minus grade for tasks on each play (for
instance, block opposing player x). Knowlton provided Sitake measures
of player contributions from performing said tasks through how much
they changed expected points. As with Lindsey, and White and Berry
before him, Knowlton was able to attach point values to player performances “whether or not they score a touchdown.”98 While nothing is
known about Mendenhall’s receptiveness, Sitake’s staff “really liked it.”99
Implementation of Analytic Practices
In addition to openness to analytics, Sitake’s working relationship with
Knowlton appeared to follow analytic best practices. Alamar, who has
advised National Basketball Association and NFL teams, asserted that for
analytics to be successful, there needs to be acknowledgement that (1) “rarely
will the analyst understand the sport as deeply as the top decision makers,”
and (2) “decision makers need to ask questions based on their deep knowledge of the sport with the goal of gaining some additional insight into the
sport in general or about a specific player or team.”100 Furthermore, when
analysts wish decision makers adopt a new metric, they must “provide the
proper evidence and context for the new metric in order to demonstrate its
value to the decision makers.”101
Knowlton’s following description indicates that his collaboration
with Sitake follows Alamar’s model: “What we do is . . . provide another
resource for the coaches. They know what they’re doing. But if they
have another resource, they can quantify that information; we want
to provide that resource.”102 Knowlton elsewhere acknowledged his
supplementary role to the more knowledgeable coach: “A coach will
95. Zachary Knowlton and Gilbert Fellingham, “Ranking NCAA Football
Teams through Expected Points,” paper presented at the 2015 Joint Statistical
Meeting of the American Statistical Association, Seattle, Wash., August 8–13, 2015.
96. Hellewell, “Statistics MVP.”
97. Knowlton, interview.
98. Quoted in Hellewell, “Statistics MVP.”
99. Knowlton, interview.
100. Alamar, Sports Analytics, 46.
101. Alamar, Sports Analytics, 71.
102. Knowlton, interview.
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have a coach’s eye. They’ve been playing football forever; they’ll know
who played well or not that game.”103 Additionally, in lock-step with
Alamar’s model, Knowlton reported having Sitake ask the research questions: “[Sitake] wants to move it toward scouting, as well as toward that
self-scouting, self-evaluation.”104 Knowlton also reported that when he
presented Sitake with a game-by-game report of the 2015 season, Sitake
replied, “This makes a lot of sense,” indicating that Knowlton effectively demonstrated the value of new metrics in the report.105 Based on
Knowlton’s description, Sitake and Knowlton followed Alamar’s blueprint for analytic success.
Offensive Scheme
While Sitake expressed enthusiasm for new statistics and analytic practices, Detmer sent a murkier signal. In his introductory press conference, Detmer fielded the following question from Utah radio personality
Greg Wrubell: “Are you into analytics at all? And what do you think are
going to be the most important offensive indicators to you?” Detmer
responded, “I haven’t been a big analytical guy.”106 He proceeded to list
basic statistics: turnovers, penalties, first downs, and red-zone scoring,
as metrics to which he would pay attention. “Football’s football at the
end of the day,” he said, exhibiting a traditionalist mindset.
Detmer focused on traditional statistics, while Sitake took more
advanced statistics like expected points to heart. Detmer did not outright reject analytics but merely expressed that he had not kept current. Moreover, he is widely known for his prodigious football mind and
may flourish without their application. Similarly, Baumer and Zimbalist
noted that the Atlanta Braves, who won fourteen consecutive division
titles, five league titles, and a World Series Championship under GM
Schuerholz, “were not known for embracing the Sabermetric philosophy,
[but] the intelligence of their front office personnel was impressive.”107
Detmer’s intelligence with in-game schematics will likely matter more
than any use of analytics.
103. Quoted in Hellewell, “Statistics MVP.”
104. Knowlton, interview.
105. Knowlton, interview.
106. Quoted in Brandon Despain, “Football—Ty Detmer Press Conference”
(Press Conference, January 5, 2016), The Official Home of the BYU Cougars,
http://byucougars.com/video/m-football/football-ty-detmer-press-conference.
107. Baumer and Zimbalist, Sabermetric Revolution, 129.
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That said, tension might arise between analytics and Detmer’s modus
operandi. For instance, the QB can receive the snap from the center to
begin the play via two means, by hand or from a distance. The latter is
known as the “shotgun” because from five or more yards behind the
line of scrimmage the quarterback can spray the ball around more easily to various receivers. A study of 2006 NFL data showed that teams
advanced, on average, five yards per play when the QB received the snap
by hand, and 6.4 yards from shotgun.108 In the same press conference,
Detmer said that he would have the QB take the snap by hand more,
which empirics seem to indicate would result in fewer yards advanced.
By stating he “would like to see more use of the tight end,” he gave all
indications of returning BYU’s offense to one similar to those of his days
as a QB, an offense in which he took virtually every snap by hand.109 But
this tension should not hinder the program. As stated earlier, analytics
should play a supplementary role to more knowledgeable decision makers, and few are more knowledgeable than Detmer.110
Davenport argued that football lagged behind baseball and basketball in analytics usage, due to (1) the complex interaction of twenty-two
players on the field, (2) the difficulty in rating performance of players on
each play, and (3) the conservative football coaching culture.111 Reason 1
owes to the nature of the sport and is immutable. The staff has mitigated
reason 2 by adopting a system of translating performance into points.
Detmer’s sustained NFL career as a “player-coach” is a possible explanation why reason 3 may be present within the program.112
If football’s lack of analytic intensity makes it lag behind other
sports, it also makes the BYU football program’s analytic intensity more
advanced relative to the rest of football. Take Mendenhall’s fourth-down

108. Mike Tanier, “Gunner Gruden,” in Pro Football Prospectus 2007, ed.
Aaron Schatz (New York: Plume, 2007), 277–79.
109. Quoted in Despain, “Ty Detmer Press Conference.” The tight end splits
time between blocking and catching.
110. Steve Young ranked Detmer behind only Joe Montana among players
with the best football intuition he had encountered in his illustrious NFL career.
See Steve Young, interview by Spencer Linton and Jarom Jordan, BYU Sports
Nation, BYUTV, January 8, 2016, available on Youtube, https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=JLwsUP6FHlU.
111. Davenport, Analytics in Sports, 6.
112. The description “player-coach” comes from Blaine Fowler. See Blaine
Fowler, interview by Spencer Linton and Brian Logan, BYU Sports Nation,
BYUTV, June 29, 2016, available on Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=Nzh48GayODU.
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behavior, for example. Although he “went for it” only a third of the time
it was advantageous for him to do so, it was still three times more frequently than NFL coaches did. BYU uses biometric data to maximize
player endurance and has engaged at least one player in analytics, two
practices Davenport deemed to be at the frontier. Mendenhall emphasized points scored and allowed, but Sitake went one step further and
adopted advanced metrics that determine how much each play contributes to those totals. There are no signs of BYU using motion-capture
data, of gathering proprietary data, or of centralizing all its data into
information systems for decision-making. The program does not appear
to have any staff devoted to analytics aside from a consultant. BYU sits
at the frontier of the revolution in some ways, but not all.
Conclusion
This article explored three main ideas from new analytic thought of
import to the program: objective tools for evaluating teams, the importance of a long-ignored position, and factors affecting recruiting.
Advanced statistics enable us to cut through much of the noise and
inform questions. While Mendenhall may have polarized fans, we now
know that his performance level was not lower than that of Edwards,
unless we grant Edwards a three-year grace period. However, it is the
position of this article that that grace period is preferred.
We also know that much of the best LDS talent is stocked at the
two most important positions. BYU’s ability to acquire elite players
at the most important position, QB, has remained steady, while much
potential remains untapped at personnel to protect the QB and rush
opposing QBs. Current coaching changes may help the program realize
that potential, but I believe the program should consider taking action
to lock in its ability to recruit OLs and DLs, an action less contingent on
the sitting staff. Lack of power-conference membership and fewer NFL
prospects have frustrated some fans; analytics confirmed the importance of the former to recruiting but complicated the latter by challenging the notion that a school’s NFL placement abilities weigh heavily
on a recruit’s college decision. This finding, though robust (it received
confirmation from two different studies), does not overturn the consensus among college football coaches that NFL aspirations drive a college
recruit’s decision.113
113. More likely, to gauge how much a school helps potential recruits’
chances to play professionally, recruits use a school’s P5 status instead of tracking how many NFL players the program produces. As then–Notre Dame head
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Analytics have shed light on the program and have also made their way
into the program’s decision-making. At the dawn of a new intellectual era
in sports, BYU’s outgoing and incoming staffs have embraced analytics to
a substantial degree. Mendenhall has left no doubt about his awareness
of at least some developments in analytics. Although he has engaged in
some not-so-analytic behavior, like icing the kicker, he appears overall to
be ahead of most of his profession regarding statistics.
The new staff ’s receptiveness to analytics depends on personnel. Sitake
has embraced an innovative way of relating the results of each football
play to points scored. Knowing how much each completed task is worth
would enable him to value plays and players more accurately and gain
a competitive advantage. The nature of his working relationship with a
statistician also demonstrates proper execution of analytic practices.114
Detmer has apparently not stayed abreast of analytic findings. Although
I identified possible tensions between analytic thought and his own thinking, I do not anticipate this to be problematic. Analytics should play a supplementary, not substitutionary role to his distinguished football intuition.
Based on this assessment, the program is at a more advanced than
average position overall with regards to analytics, though many opportunities remain unexplored.115 While this article includes only a sampling
of new analytic ideas, its primary motivation is to begin a conversation
and engage the passionate numerati (quantitatively oriented fans) to
consecrate their skills to creating independent resources that will identify possible advantages for the program and assist in bringing positive
publicity to BYU and its sponsoring church.

coach Charlie Weis said in his introductory press conference, “When players
[are] going to college, when they go to front-line programs, they want to be able
to play on Sundays. They want to play on Saturdays, so that they could end up
playing on Sundays.” “Notre Dame Head Coach Charlie Weis Teleconference
Transcript” (Press Conference, December 13, 2004), ND, http://www.und.com/
sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/121304aaa.html; emphasis added. “Playing on Sundays” alludes to NFL games, “playing on Saturdays” to college games.
114. Reports from BYU’s sports analytics group late in the publication process
indicate that Sitake suspended his meetings with the group when the 2016 season
started. The relationship between the program and analytics remains in flux.
115. This is changing rapidly even as this article heads to the press. See
Sharon Katz, “College Football’s Analytics Revolution Is Just Beginning,” ESPN,
September 30, 2016, http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/17677192
/college-football-analytics-revolution-just-beginning.
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Appendix A: Data Sources
BYU Historical Games Results (used in tables 1 and 2). Massey Ratings.
Games can be downloaded from http://www.masseyratings.com/team.
php?t=891&s=279541. Each game conveniently contains the opponent’s
final Massey rank on the same row.
Draft Data. Cougarstats. Players are listed on http://sltrib.cougarstats
.com/draft.php.
Recruiting Data (used in tables 3 and 4). Scout. This information can
be downloaded from http://www.scout.com/college/byu/2015-footballcommits. Scout.com profiles for each player identify whether players
are LDS. Polynesians identified but not by name on that list are Jake
Kuresa and Kyle Van Noy.
NCAA Run/Pass Frequencies. ESPN. Rushing: http://espn.go.com/
college-football/statistics/team/_/stat/rushing. Passing: http://espn.go
.com/college-football/statistics/team/_/stat/passing.
NFL Run/Pass Frequencies. ESPN. Rushing: http://espn.go.com/nfl/sta
tistics/player/_/stat/rushing. Passing: http://espn.go.com/nfl/statistics/
player/_/stat/passing.
BYU Play-by-Play Data (used in table 5). ESPN/BYU Athletics. Downloaded from http://espn.go.com/college-football/team/schedule/_/
id/252/year/2015/byu-cougars. I derived Mendenhall’s fourth-down
decisions from this data. For some reason, the 2006 and 2007 Tulsa
games had play-by-play data missing. Fortunately, they can be accessed
here: http://byucougars.com/m-football/event/2006/tulsa and here:
http://byucougars.com/m-football/event/2007/tulsa.
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OPP_MASSEY_RANK

1
n = 529

Variable

0.775

0.363

0.1357471*

–5.431897*

–10.834492***

2.966057****

0.207046****

–2.863863*

3
n = 480

0.763

0.365

0.1235686*

–6.381887*

–11.320090***

2.717105****

0.207197****

–2.399087

4
n = 456

Table 7. EGLS-AR(1), Impact on Margin-of-Victory, Equal Grace Periods for Edwards and Mendenhall

#p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; ****p < .0001.

Pseudo-R

% Games Predicted

0.1480461*

εg−1

2

–3.184314#

COACHMENDENHALL

–10.207137**

–3.466628

INTERCEPT

COACHCROWTON

1
(1973–2015)
n = 541

Variable

Table 6. EGLS-AR(1), Impact on Margin-of-Victory, Grace Periods for LaVell Edwards
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Appendix B: EGLS-AR(1) Regressions
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Appendix C: Limitations to Study
The BYU football staff and its statistical consultants have undoubtedly used more metrics than what outsiders can discern. Furthermore,
recruiting rankings are determined by scouts and are subjective. Finally,
statistical analysis is no substitute for the immeasurables of a good
coach, quarterback, or left tackle.

Nelson Chung is a GS-11 Mathematical Statistician for the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Center for Disclosure Avoidance Research. He holds an BA from Brigham
Young University in economics and political science, and an MS from Johns
Hopkins University in applied mathematics. The Census Bureau did not provide monetary or in-kind funding for this article.
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